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INTRODUCTION 
 
Over 76 years ago, Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court 
called for the adoption of strict liability for products liability cases and for the 
rejection of negligence in such cases. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
recently agreed in Tincher v. Omega Flex, Inc.1 Strict liability leads to corporate 
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1 104 A.3d 328 (Pa. 2014). 
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liability and this results in increased payments to victims and slightly lower 
profits. Corporations responded to strict liability with a firm embrace of the 
negligence cause of action, which puts both parties on an equal footing. This 
results in corporations winning more cases. The PLAC (an association of cor-
porations that file amici briefs defending corporations) argued for negligence 
in Tincher. 
In this Article, I argue in favor of strict liability and support the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court’s decision in Tincher. 
 
I.  A SHORT HISTORY OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 
 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court provided critical clarification of 
strict products liability in Tincher v. Omega Flex, Inc. Because the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court modified strict products liability in Pennsylvania, it is 
important to understand the development of this type of cause of action. 
Products liability has long-existed in the United States. In 1942 in 
Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., the Supreme Court of California held that 
because the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to satisfy the requirements 
of res ipsa locquitor, an inference of negligence could be drawn.2 The Supreme 
Court of California also reiterated that when a defendant presents evidence to 
rebut an inference of negligence under res ipsa locquitor, a question of fact 
whether the reference has been dispelled arises.3 However, the importance of 
Escola is Justice Traynor’s concurring opinion where he argues that manu-
facturers should be held to the standard of strict liability.”4  In his concurrence, 
Justice Traynor explained that negligence was not working in products liability 
cases because such cases were costly, circular, and often led to bad results.5 
“[P]ublic policy demands that responsibility be found wherever it will most 
effectively reduce the hazards to life and health interest in defective products 
that reach the market.”6 
In the years following Escola, the Supreme Court of California again 
heard various products liability cases and further developed its jurisprudence.  
In 1963, the Supreme Court of California was presented with another products 
liability case.7 Writing for the majority, Justice Traynor was able to turn his 
concurrence in Escola into law.  The Supreme Court of California in Greenman 
																																								 																				
2 150 P.2d 436, 440 (Cal. 1944).  
3 Id.  
4 FRANK J. VANDALL, A HISTORY OF CIVIL LITIGATION 27 (2011). 
5 Escola, 150 P.2d at 441 (Traynor, J., concurring). 
6 Id. at 440 (Traynor, J., concurring). 
7 Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., 377 P.2d 897, 900 (Cal. 1963). 
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concluded that the manufacturer of a produce is strictly liable “when an article 
he places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for 
defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being.”8    
Years later in Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., the Supreme Court of 
California outlined two tests.9 In Barker, the defendant company’s high-lift fork-
lift lacked outriggers, which made the forklift more susceptible to turning over.10  
Indeed, the defendant company’s high-lift forklift fell over because of the absen-
ce of outriggers and ultimately injured Barker, the operator of the equipment.11 
Barker, injured by the defendant company’s high-lift forklift sued the company, 
alleging that the forklift accident was caused by one or more defects in the 
forklift loader.12 Hearing the appeal, the Barker majority adopted a strict liability 
standard, holding that strict liability applied to defective products.13  
In 1965, the American Law Institute (ALI) adopted a Greenman-like 
statement of strict products liability in the Restatement (Second) of Torts.14  
Specifically, the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A provides: 
 
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User 
or Consumer.  
 
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreas-
onably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property 
is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to 
the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if 
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a pro-
duct, and 
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer with-
out substantial change in the condition in which it is sold. 
																																								 																				
8 Id. at 900. 
9 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978). The Supreme Court of California “reiterate[d that] a product may 
be found defective in design, so as to subject a manufacturer to strict liability for resulting 
injuries under either of two alternative tests.” Id. at 455. “First, a product may be found 
defective in design if the plaintiff establishes that the product failed to perform as safely as an 
ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner.” 
Id. at 455-56.  “Second, a product may alternatively be found defective in design if the plaintiff 
demonstrates that the product’s design proximately caused his injury and the defendant fails to 
establish, in light of the relevant factors, that, on balance, the benefits of the challenged design 
outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such design.” Id. at 456. 
10 Id. at 447.  
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 446. 
14 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A. 
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(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although  
(a) the user or consumer has not bought the product from 
or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.15 
 
Justice Traynor persuasively laid out the reasons for shifting from the 
negligence standard to the strict liability standard.16 As provided in his concur-
ring opinion in Escola, Justice Traynor wrote:  
 
I believe the manufacturer’s negligence should no longer be 
singled out as the basis of a plaintiff’s right to recover in cases 
like the present one.  In my opinion it should now be recognized 
that a manufacturer incurs [strict liability] when an article that 
he has placed on the market, knowing that it is to be used 
without inspection, proves to have a defect that causes injury to 
human beings. . . . Even if there is no negligence, however, 
public policy demands that responsibility be fixed wherever it 
will most effectively reduce the hazards to life and health 
inherent in defective products that reach the market.  It is evident 
that the manufacturer can anticipate some hazards and guard 
against the recurrence of others, as the public cannot.  Those who 
suffer injury from defective products are unprepared to meet its 
consequences. The cost of an injury and the loss of time or health 
may be an overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and a 
needless one for the risk of injury can be insured by the manu-
facturer and distributed among the public as a cost of doing 
business. It is to the public interest to discourage the marketing 
of products having defects that are a menace to the public. If such 
products nevertheless find their way into the market, it is to the 
public interest to place the responsibility for whatever injury they 
may cause upon the manufacturer, who, even if he is not negli-
gent in the manufacture of the product, is responsible for its 
reaching the market. 
 
It is needlessly circuitous to make negligence the basis of recov-
ery and impose what is in reality liability without negligence.  If 
public policy demands that a manufacturer of goods be respons-
ible for their quality regardless of negligence there is no reason 
not to fix that responsibility openly . . . .  
																																								 																				
15 Id. 
16 Escola, 150 P.2d 436. 
 
Vol. 3:2]   Tincher Unmasked 
 
 
95 
. . . As handicrafts have been replaced by mass production with 
its great markets and transportation facilities, the close relation-
ship between the producer and consumer of a product has been 
altered. Manufacturing processes, frequently valuable secrets are 
ordinarily either inaccessible to or beyond the ken of the general 
public. The consumer no longer has means or skill enough to 
investigate for himself the soundness of a product, even when it 
is not contained in a sealed package, and his erstwhile vigilance 
has been lulled by the steady efforts of manufacturers to build up 
confidence by advertising and marketing devices such as trade-
marks . . . .  
 
Consumers no longer approach products warily but accept them 
on faith, relying on the reputation of the manufacturer or the trade 
mark . . . .17 
 
 Writing for the majority in Greenman, Justice Traynor took the oppor-
tunity to “make clear that the liability [of manufacturers of defective products] 
is not one governed by the law of contract warranties but by the law of strict 
liability in tort.”18 These policies established in California regarding strict 
products liability form the foundation of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s 
decision in Tincher.  
 
II.  AZZARELLO19 AND TINCHER  
 
A. Azzarello:  Pennsylvania Strict Products Liability Before 2014 
  
 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided Azzarello in 1978. In Azza-
rello, the plaintiff suffered an injury to his hand following an incident involving 
a coating machine.20 As a result of having his right hand crushed in the rollers 
of a coating machine, the plaintiff sued the manufacturer of the machine in strict 
liability and the manufacturer joined the employer as a co-defendant.21 The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the language from § 402A “unreas-
onable dangerous” had no place in a strict liability charge to the jury.22 This 
decision tracked the California case of Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson, Corp., which 
																																								 																				
17 Escola, 150 P.2d at 440 (Traynor, J., concurring). 
18 Greenman, supra note 7, at 901. 
19 Azzarello v. Black Bros, Co., 391 A.2d 1020 (Pa. 1978).   
20  Id. at 1022. 
21  Id. 
22  Id.  
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involved a defective bread rack in a delivery truck.23 In Cronin, the Supreme 
Court of California approved a charge on “defect” and rejected giving a charge 
containing the phrase “reasonably dangerous.”24 It reasoned that those words 
sounded of negligence and were inappropriate in a strict liability charge.25 
 Likewise, the Azzarello Court said “unreasonably dangerous” wrongly 
“signaled to the jury that the consumer has the burden to prove . . . negli-
gence.”26 The Court concluded “in strict liability cases, burdening a plaintiff 
with proof of negligence is unwarranted; the sellers liability is sufficiently lim-
ited” by the necessity of proving that there was a defect in the manufacture or 
design of the product . . . .”27 
 Azzarello divided the tasks for the court and jury in a strict liability case 
and can be summarized as follows:  the court shall determine the applicability 
of the phrases “defective condition” and “unreasonably dangerous” which are 
indicators of “whether recovery would be justified.”28 Such determinations are 
issues of law and policy “entrusted solely . . . to the trial court.”29 In contrast, 
“the inquiry into whether a plaintiff has proven the factual allegations . . . is a 
question for the jury.”30 
 In a stroke of the pen, the Azzarello Court went too far thirty-nine years 
ago when it, without necessity, added “the seller is a ‘guarantor’ of the pro-
duct.”31 The addition of this term is misleading and not needed to implement 
strict liability in products cases. What followed in Pennsylvania was thirty-five 
years of high wind and rough waters. The first fifty-nine pages of the Tincher 
decision outline the nature of these numerous legal problems.  Azzarello would 
have been clearer and less troublesome for Pennsylvania if it had merely said 
that the manufacturer of a defective product would be held liable. 
 
B. Tincher and Its Holding 
 
 Tincher is a simple products liability case.  The manufacturer of flexi-
ble stainless steel pipe designed to carry natural gas into a house-marketed pipe 
that was very thin (“the thickness of four sheets of paper”).32  Lightning struck 
																																								 																				
23  501 P.2d 1153 (Cal. 1972).  
24  Id. 
25  Id. 
26 John Lavelle, Jr., 7 Takeaways from Pa. High Court’s Tort Revamp, Law 360 (Jan. 6, 2015), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/607722/7-takeaways-from-pa-high-court-s-tort-revamp.  
27 Tincher, 104 A.3d at 367 (discussing the Court’s reasoning and analysis in Azzarello). 
28 Id.  
29 Id. 
30 Id.  
31 Id.  
32 Id. at 337. 
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the pipe at the Tinchers.33 The house burned and was severely damaged.34  The 
issue raised was should the pipe manufacturer, Omega Flex, bear the loss 
caused by the thin pipe.35 The thin pipe was alleged to be defective because it 
did not meet the gold standard of thick cast iron pipe.36   
 Following almost forty years of debate about the meaning of strict 
products liability, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided to use Tincher to 
clarify the law by putting negligence theory in products cases to rest.37  First it 
reversed the lower court that had followed Azzarello.38 Second, the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court adopted the holding in the California case of Barker39 , 
which provides a two-part test for defect.  Tincher states that proving either test 
will suffice: “[w]e hold that, in Pennsylvania, the cause of action in strict 
products liability requires proof in the alternative, either of the ordinary 
consumers expectations test or the risk-utility test.40 
 Earlier in the Tincher opinion the Pennsylvania Supreme Court defined 
these two tests.  Under the consumer expectation test, “the product is in a defec-
tive condition, if the danger is unknowable and unacceptable to the average or 
ordinary consumer.”41 Quoting comment (i) to the Restatement, the Court said 
“The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be 
contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary 
knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics.”42  A court may 
consider several factors: “the nature of the product, the identity of the user, the 
products intended use and intended user, and any express or implied represent-
tations by the manufacturer or seller . . . .”43 
 Attention was also given in Tincher to defining the risk-utility test.  
“The test offers a standard which . . . states that:  a product is in a defective 
condition if a ‘reasonable person’ would conclude that the probability and 
seriousness of harm caused by the product outweighed the burden of the costs 
of taking precautions.”44  The important distinction between strict liability and 
negligence is manifest in the charge to the jury.  In negligence the jury is asked 
																																								 																				
33 Tincher, 104 A.3d at 335-36. 
34 Id.  
35 Id. at 335. 
36 Id. at 335-36. 
37 Id. at 335. 
38 Tincher, 104 A.3d at 335. 
39 Id. at 368. 
40 Id. at 401. 
41 Id. at 335. 
42 Id. at 387. 
43 Tincher, 104 A.3d at 387.  
44 Id. at 389 (citations omitted). 
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whether the design team was negligent, did they exercise care.  In contrast, in 
strict liability the jury only looks at the product and weighs whether the product 
was defective, the care of the design team is irrelevant.45 This is often made 
clear by saying that “care” by the manufacturer is not admitted before a jury in 
a strict liability products case.46  In strict liability, the court is often criticizing 
the product design program of a large corporation by calling the design 
defective. Thus the outrage on the part of corporations because they believe 
they are the experts.47 
 Strict liability beat out negligence in the products arena for the reasons 
stated earlier by Justice Traynor and because it is cheaper and more efficient.48  
Under §402A of the Restatement (Second), all sellers of the defective product 
are strictly liable: the retailer, wholesaler, distributor, importer and the manu-
facturer.49 But, under the old discredited negligence cause of action, separate, 
costly and time consuming suits must be brought against each entity in the 
chain of distribution from retailer to manufacturer.50  The goal of this long ex-
pensive negligence process was to exhaust the funds and resolve of the victim.  
It usually worked. Because victims often lost suits that they should have won, 
the A.L.I adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A in 1963.51 
 The Supreme Court deserves academic support for seeing through the 
political haze and clearly rejecting the Restatement (Third) of Torts § 2b.  The 
Restatement (Third) of Torts is a corporate white paper advocating maxi-
negligence and rests on a foundation of misrepresentation.  It says the view of 
the majority of courts in 1993 is that a “reasonable alternative design” must be 
shown.52  John Vargo unearthed this fabrication in his 400 page article that 
reviewed every decided products case, “reasonable alternative design” was 
only followed by a few cases and was far from being the holding of the majority 
																																								 																				
45  Id. at 368 (citations omitted). 
46 Id. at 362-63. Seventy-three years ago, Justice Traynor argued: “[I]t is to the public interest 
to place the responsibility for injury upon the manufacturer even if he is not negligent in the 
manufacture of the product, [he] is responsible for it reaching the market.”  Escola, 150 P.2d 
at 438-41 (Traynor, J., concurring).  
47 See LEE PATRICK STROBEL, RECKLESS HOMICIDE: FORD’S PINTO TRIAL 27 (1980). 
48 See VANDALL, supra note 4, at 23-4 (quoting Professor Mitch Polinsky). 
49 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A. 
50 In Judge Traynor’s concurring decision in Escola, he made clear the victim under 
negligence must sue the immediate seller. Escola, 150 P.2d at 442-44 (Traynor, J., 
concurring). If the immediate seller (dealer) loses, the dealer must sue the distributor.  If the 
seller is bankrupt, the victim recovers nothing. Id. at 442. In strict liability, anyone in the 
product chain can be sued: manufacturer, distributor, importer, or immediate seller.  See 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, 402A. 
51 VANDALL, supra note 4, at 30. 
52 Id. at 89. 
Vol. 3:2]   Tincher Unmasked 
 
 
99 
of cases.53  Further, the approach set forth in the Restatement (Third) of Torts 
is not one of simple negligence; rather, it is one of maxi-negligence because 
it demands that a “reasonable alternative design” be shown by the victim in 
all products cases.54 It is designed to hobble the plaintiff, eliminate strict lia-
bility, and force her to show more than mere negligence.55 As noted by the 
Court in Tincher, all states, with the exception of Iowa, rejected the Restate-
ment (Third) Products Liability § 2(a).56 With this background, the Tincher 
Court reversed the Superior Court and awarded a new trial.57  
 
III. “REBOOTING PENNSYLVANIA PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW” 
 
 “Rebooting Pennsylvania Products Liability Law”58 should be titled 
“A Retro Look at Pennsylvania Products Liability Law” because it begs to 
return to laws of pre–1963 in order to assist the injuring corporations as in 
the old days. “Reboot” is simply a rehash of old law. The author, James Beck 
strives to reintroduce negligence in order to help injurers, on the basis of the 
law of 1963. At that time, negligence offered a neutral balancing of interests 
in the courtroom. This meant the defendant corporation usually won because 
it had the experts, the knowledge, the foresight, the staying power and the 
money.59 In 1963, underfunded plaintiffs were routinely knocked-out by 
well-funded defendants. This unacceptable result demanded that the American 
Law Institute adopt the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A in 1964. The 
foundation of § 402A is that the manufacturer of a defective product is liable 
to an injured consumer or user.60 It is not a neutral balancing of interests 
between parties when a product is defective as is found in negligence. 
 
																																								 																				
53 Id. at 98-9.  See also Tincher, 104 A.3d at 353, n. 6; 355, n. 7; 386.   
54 VANDALL, supra note 4, at 89. 
55  See id. at 90 (Section 2(b) does not advance progress because (1) “it neither relies on nor 
furthers traditional products liability policies”; (2) “it does not accurately reflect the practice 
of courts today” and (3) “it does not benefit consumers.” Rather, Section 2(b) “solely benefits 
sellers.”). 
56 Tincher, 104 A.3d at 349 (citing Frank J. Vandall and Joshua F. Vandall, A Call for an 
Accurate Restatement (Third) of Torts: Design Defect, 33 U. MEMPHIS L. REV. 909 (2003)). 
57 Id. at 335.  
58 James M. Beck, Esq., “Rebooting Pennsylvania Products Liability Law:  Tincher v. Omega 
Flex and the End of Azzarello Super Strict Liability, 26 WIDENER L. J. 91 (2017) 
59 Townsley & Hanks, The Trial Courts Responsibility to Make Cigarette Disease Litigation 
Affordable and Fair, 25 CAL. W.L. REV. 275, 276-77 (1988). 
60  Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A. 
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IV.  A CRITIQUE OF THE TEN OLD SHIBBOLETHS  
PRESENTED IN “REBOOTING” 
 
1. James Beck argues the decision in Tincher is a “revolutionary” expan-
sion of product liability [law].61 Not so. The Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 402A (1965) is a foundation of products law. In fact, Justice 
Traynor in Escola foreshadowed it twenty-two years earlier in 1942.62  
He argued that negligence in product’s cases was a waste of time, money 
and judicial resources and that strict liability was needed.63  Therefore, 
strict liability is 75-years-old and hardly revolutionary.  
 
2. Beck argues for a return to contributory negligence in defective products 
cases.64 Contributory negligence has been rejected by numerous courts in 
products cases because it reintroduces negligence and would lead to bad 
results.65 Contributory negligence may be present, but it is more efficient 
to put the loss on the seller, because he can take preventative measures.66    
        
3. The author of “Rebooting” bemoans the fact that the “reasonable man” 
concept is no longer present in a products jury charge.67 The “reason-
able man,” concept was rejected in 1972 in Cronin.68  Cronin involved 
a defective bread-tray latch. While stopping the truck, the trays flew 
																																								 																				
61  Beck, supra note 58, at 93. 
62  Escola, 150 P.2d at 440 (Traynor, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted) (“In my 
opinion it should now be recognized that a manufacturer incur an absolute liability when an 
article that he has placed on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection, 
proves to have a defect that causes injury to human beings.”). 
63  See VANDALL, supra note 4, at 13 (stating that Justice Traynor’s concurring opinion advocates 
a position whereby “recovery in products liability cases should rest upon absolute liability.”).  
64 Beck, supra note 58, at 101.  
65 Pennsylvania rejected contributory negligence in 1975. See McCown v. Int’l Harvester 
Co., 342 A.2d 381 (Pa. 1975) (“Adoption of contributory negligence . . . would defeat our 
acceptance of 402A.”).  For example, an automobile driver may be speeding (driving at 75 
miles per hour in a 70 miles per hour speed zone) when his car flips and the defective roof 
collapses, breaking the driver’s neck. Yes, the driver was contributorily negligent in 
speeding, but it makes more sense to hold car manufacturer strictly liable than to throw out 
the case under contributory negligence.  Roofs should not be defectively weak and many 
people are negligent and travel over the speed limit.  Here, strict liability will help make cars 
safer, reduce healthcare costs, and save lives.  
66 The Court in Azzarello stated that “it is now the consumer who must be protected . . . the 
risk of loss must be placed upon the supplier of the defective product without regard to fault.”  
Azzarello, 391 A.2d at 1023-24. 
67 Beck, supra note 58, at 112. 
68 Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 501 P.2d 1153 (Cal. 1972). 
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forward and hit the driver in the back and propelled him through the 
windshield.69 Defendant argued that the jury must be charged on the 
“reasonable man” concept, but the California Supreme Court rejected 
that because it  “sounded of negligence.”70 
 
4. The financial reality today is that many cars, trucks and machines are 
leased rather than sold. The lessor is treated as the “seller” under § 
402A71, but Beck argues for financial unreality by suggesting that 
lessors should not be treated as “sellers,” not be treated as part of the 
chain of distribution.72 This, even though a large lessor can spread the 
loss as well as a large seller. A huge portion of cars and trucks are 
leased. The lessor will profit if he is not held liable. Today he is a 
member of the distributive chain and must be liable as a seller.73  
Ignoring financial reality is attractive to Beck because it leaves victims 
without a monied defendant. 
 
5. A key concept in products law is that the seller should be liable for a 
defective product because the victim is often innocent.74  Pennsylvania 
has held “it is now the consumer who must be protected. Courts have . 
. . adopted the position that the risk of loss must be placed upon the 
supplier of the defective product . . . .”75  This is because the victim 
lacks knowledge of the defect and can do nothing to prevent it. For 
example, people who were burned to death in the crashes of Pinto 
automobiles could do nothing to prevent them, but Ford knew of the 
risk the gas tank would explode in a rear-end crash and has since 
changed the design of their tanks.76  Beck argues that, as in yore, the 
loss should rest on the innocent victim who could do nothing to prevent 
the rear-end crashes that were a cause in fact of the Pinto fires.77  
																																								 																				
69  Id. at 1155-56. 
70  Id.  
71  See Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing, 212 A.2d 769 (N.J. 1965) (as an example of the 
dramatic growth of strict liability in products liability law). 
72  Beck, supra note 58, at 104. 
73 Strict liability applies to a lessor of trucks because “(1) [t]he risk of harm to the lessee . . . 
and members of the public is great; (2) the representations of the lessor that the vehicle is fit 
. . . ; [and] (3) the reliance of the lessee.  [T]he inducement offered to the consumer through 
advertising and solicitation encourages reliance.” Cintrone, 212 A.2d at 781. 
74  See Escola, 150 P.2d 436.  
75  Beck, supra note 58, at 105. 
76 VANDALL, supra note 4, at 22, n. 51 (citing LEE PATRICK STROBEL, RECKLESS HOMICIDE: 
FORD’S PINTO TRIAL 27 (1980)). 
77  See Beck, supra note 58, at 105-07.  
                                  Journal of Law & Public Affairs                [Aug. 2018 
 
 
102 
6.  When a product has a defect and causes damage, sometimes “bystan-
ders” are injured. Beck rejects recovery by “bystanders”, however.78 In 
Elmore v. American Motors Corp., the defective drive shaft of a rear-
drive car dropped down and pole-vaulted the car into the on-coming 
lane.79 The issue was whether the automobile seller should be liable to 
the victim. The court held the seller should be liable, because he 
manufactured the automobile, knew of the defect and could prevent it 
in the future.80 
 
7. One thing corporations do well is to evaluate and take financial risks.  
This may result in huge profits, but may also result in bankruptcy and 
this often leaves no one for the victim to sue.81 The product issue becom-
es whether the victim should be able to sue the successor corporation, 
the one that follows the bankruptcy or sale of the corporation. Logic and 
the law argue that he should be able to sue the successor corporation.  
Beck cries foul.82  The simple answer to this problem is for the new 
corporation to do due-diligence and research before the purchase of the 
corporations, to find-out if any products suits are pending or likely to be 
filed. They should reduce the size of the offer by the amount of the 
outstanding risk. Again “Reboot” ignores financial reality. 
 
8. Try this next exercise. Read your tire’s sidewall and report the manu-
facturers preferred inflation level. This is usually obscure and hard to 
decipher even though getting the tire pressure wrong can cause death 
from an exploding tire. “Reboot” prefers corporate inaction, even at the 
risk of death. “The winning claim in Dambacher83 was modest – that a 
warning should have been embossed on the tire.”84 Beck fails to explain 
why embossing a warning on a tire’s sidewall is costly and difficult. 
The fallacy in his argument is reflected in the fact that sidewall 
warnings are commonly available today.  
																																								 																				
78  Id. at 107. 
79  451 P.2d 84 (Cal. 1969). 
80  Id. 
81  Beck, supra note 58, at 108. 
82  Id. at 108. 
83 Dambacher v. Mallis, 485 A.2d 408 (1984) (en banc), appeal dismissed, 500 A.2d 428 
(1985), overruled sub silentio on other grounds, Phillips v. Cricket Lighters, 841 A.2d 1000, 
1008 (2003) (as to negligence claim). 
84  Beck, supra note 58, at 109. 
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9. Clearly judges have a different task than juries.  However, Beck argues: 
“Although courts engage in multi-factorial analysis to evaluate ‘unreas-
onable dangerous defect initially, juries were not allowed to consider 
these same factors under the Azzarello ‘any element’ standard.”85 A 
few more sentences to clarify his point would have helped. He proba-
bly meant that the jury should be charged to weigh these factors.  But, 
such a charge would sound in negligence.  
 
10. The reason industry standards are unreliable and not controlling in strict 
liability cases is because they were written by the defendant corpor-
ations or their associations in order to maximize profits and often not 
to promote safety.86  Beck calls for industry standards to nevertheless 
control in products case.87 Tincher rejected that argument: [The] Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court [ ] held ‘industry standards’ go to the negligence 
concept of reasonable care, and . . .  under our decision in Azzarello such 
a concept has no place in an action based on strict liability in tort.”88 
 
 In summary, “Reboot” has failed to persuade because the author ignores 
products liability history, legal progress and economic reality. He claims 
“Tincher represents a sea-change in the products liability field.”89 But that  
is demonstrably wrong. Products theory emerged 75 years ago in Escola and 
was codified by the A.L.I. 53-years-ago in the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§ 402A. Further, Tincher rests on the history of perhaps 5,000 decided 
products cases.90  
 He is further mistaken in concluding “negligence concepts of reason-
ableness and foreseeability have returned to the strict liability battlefield.”91 
Tincher holds just the opposite. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court followed the 
approach established by the California Supreme Court and stated that “we 
																																								 																				
85  Id. at 111 (citations omitted). 
86 See VANDALL, supra note 4, at 74-5 (citation omitted) (“The effectiveness of manu-
facturers in influencing administrative agencies to adopt certain safety standards is well-
known. Manufacturers thus may prefer to have agencies rather than courts set standards.”).  
87 Beck, supra note 58, at 114-15. 
88  Id. at 113. 
89 Id. at 182. 
90  In 1992, Professor James Henderson said there were 3,000 cases. I am assuming there are 
perhaps 2,000 more now.  James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed 
Revision of Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1512, 
n.1.   
91  Beck, supra note 58, at 182.  
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follow the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A and Barker.92 The injured 
person is free to choose either the consumer expectation test or the risk-utility 
test.93 This is the Pennsylvania system of strict products liability largely dis-
connected from negligence.     
 
V.  HOUSE KEEPING POINTS 
 
A. Tasks of the Judge and Jury in a Strict Liability Products Case 
  
 The task of the court is to determine whether sufficient evidence of 
defect has been presented by the victim to send the case to the jury. The Tincher 
Court stated: “[C]ounsel must articulate the . . . strict liability claim by alleging 
sufficient facts to make a prima facie case premised upon either a ‘consumer 
expectations’ or ‘risk-utility’ theory, or both.”94  
 However, the jury may not be left to guess:  “[T]he jury may not be  left 
free to find a violation of  . . . consumer expectations whenever it chooses.  
Unless the facts . . . permit an inference that the product . . . did not meet the 
minimum safety expectations of . . . ordinary users, the jury must follow the 
second test and engage in the balancing of risks and benefits . . . .”95  The judge 
is still the gatekeeper.  If the victim fails to show sufficient evidence under the 
consumer expectation test, then “the jury must be instructed solely on the . . . 
risk-benefit theory of design announced in Barker.”96  To be sure the jury is 
left to decide the factual questions in the case such as the thickness of the 
Omega-flex pipe, if that is contested.  
 
B. Should the Burden of Proving a Safe Product Be Shifted to the Seller? 
 
 The second prong of Barker held: “once the plaintiff makes a prima 
facie showing that the injury was proximately caused by the product's design, 
the burden should appropriately shift to the defendant to prove, in light of the 
relevant factors, that the product is not defective.”97  In Tincher, the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court is troubled by this uncommon burden shift.98  The Court, 
however, refused to decide the burden shift question because it had not been 
briefed.  It said, “shifting the burden of proof onto a defendant places the risks 
																																								 																				
92 Tincher, 104 A.3d at 406.  
93 Id. 
94  Id. 
95 Id. at 392. 
96  Id. at 407, n. 29. 
97  Barker, 573 P.2d at 455-56. 
98  Tincher, 104 A.3d at 406. 
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of an erroneous decision upon the defendant. . . .  Pennsylvania does not 
presume a product to be defective . . . proving a negative is generally not 
desirable . . . because of fairness concerns.”99  Although the above discussion 
is dicta, the Court here foreshadows that it may reject the Barker burden shift.  
 
VII.  TINCHER CAPTURES OUTSIDE INTEREST 
  
 As I write to evaluate Tincher, professional critics have also commented 
on it. The Products Liability Advisory Council (PLAC) argued for negligence.100 
Winning a suit is a matter of percentages. The negligence action favors manu-
facturers and strict liability favors victims. The PLAC represents their corporate 
members by arguing for the negligence cause of action through amici briefs in 
product cases. 
 The task of PLAC is not to do research. Instead they are professional 
Amici.101 Their goal is to get two bites at the apple for defendant corporations.  
They are a club for corporations and they produce briefs that take the injurers 
view. Of course this view has already been thoroughly presented by the 
defendant corporation so PLAC hopes to persuade the court by adding weight:  
two groups (injurer and PLAC) make the same argument. The Tincher Court 
perceptively saw through this charade and concluded: “The amici offer 
essentially the same legal and policy arguments as those parties in support of 
whom their briefs were filed.”102  
 
 CONCLUSION 
 
Tincher did much to clarify Pennsylvania products liability law and 
thus assist the victim to recover. It adopted a two-part test for design defect that 
originated in 1963. It rejected the defense of contributory negligence and the 
maxi-negligence concept of the Restatement 3rd, therefore, a victim need not 
																																								 																				
99  Id. at 408-09. 
100 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted that the PLAC as amici supported Omega Flex. 
Id. at 394, n. 23.  Because Omega Flex supported negligence, it follows that the PLAC also 
supported negligence and opposed strict liability. Id.  
101  In Escola, Justice Traynor argued that strict liability should rest on the manufacturer 
because the manufacturer placed the product into the market, advertised the product, and could 
spread the loss. 150 P.2d at 440-44. Strict liability is easier to show for the victim because she 
can sue the local seller, the distributor, or the manufacturer. Only a product defect need be 
shown. In contrast, under negligence, someone must be shown to have failed to have used care 
and a lawsuit must be brought against the local seller, who may in fact be bankrupt.  This is a 
steep road to victory for the victim. Therefore, I assume there are more victories under strict 
liability than under negligence.  
102  Tincher, 104 A.3d at 386, n. 23. 
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show a “reasonable alternative design.” The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held 
in Tincher that the court must first determine that there are grounds for holding 
that the product is defective before sending the question of defect to the jury. 
Importantly, Pennsylvania’s highest court rejected the PLAC’s argument for 
negligence and held fast to strict liability and protecting the victim. 
 
Well done, Pennsylvania! 
 
 
